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Jaroslav Janata: Conceptual systems - an attempt at system noetics Discover yourself

<u>Summary:</u> Current failure to disprove skeptical and agnostical notions in philosophy leads to the conclusion that reality is the main target of our intellectual effort, but it is directly inaccessible in its absolute essence. We have therefore no option but to approach it by subjective means. Therefore even philosophy cannot build on objectivist, dogmatic notions, but on <u>subjectivism and relativism</u>, and understand reality not as a source but as a target or main direction of our intellectual effort.

This notion is developed into <u>system noetics</u>, which understands thinking as controlling of a conceptual system by its subject, where the subject creates and controls this conceptual system to achieve desired results, especially cognition of reality and realization of desired goals.

From this notion a system of categories and principles may be derived, which treats both cognitive and volitive functions in a new manner. On these foundations the author builds a new original theory of <u>truth and rightness</u>, both subjective and objective, and creates a corresponding classification of sciences and orders. It declares <u>noetics</u> as a science examining the manner of controlling of the CS by its subject, especially its structure and behavior and its functionality related to the desired tasks.

In this sense this work describes only the basic application of these principles in noetics, because further elaboration is according to the principles of subjectivity and relativity in the realm of other subject and their executive conceptual systems.

Introduction.

The results of basic skeptical and agnostical works [especially Hume and Berkeley, Vaihinger, Mach, but also Protagoras and Socrates' "I know that I know nothing"] demonstrate, that the idea of the objectivist way of thinking, which derives our knowledge from the objective reality as its basis, is undemonstrable, and the science based on this idea builds on sand. When it is uncertain whether true reality is objective reality or just a sum of the subject's sensations, I cannot base my knowledge on reality but on the subject, which can be a much more reliable primary source of all our knowledge.

Already Kant attempted to solve this problem by his copernican reversal but was inconsistent in many points which resulted in further deviations from his notion.

I attempted to correct some of Kant's inconsistencies, to purify his copernican reversal, to add a basic instrument, principle of control and further elaborate on this in the directions of both cognition and volition. Knowledge thus obtained I have then summarized into a specific science, which I called noetics by tradition, and as it is based on system theory, it is called system noetics.

I. Basic principles of noetics

Thus conceived system noetics is based on three principles:

- a) The reality in its absolute essence is not directly accessible to the subject, so that he has no other option but to approach it indirectly by subjective means (<u>principle of subjectivity</u>)
- b) To achieve this he creates notional means, so-called conceptual system, to which he gives specific rules of structure and behaviour, especially criteria of truth and rightness (principle of relativity of conceptual systems)
- c) The subject does not use subjectivity and relativity of his thinking liberally or wilfully, but targets his conceptual system intentionally at the solution of pursued tasks, especially cognition of reality and attainment of results desired (principle of controlling the conceptual system by its subject)

The reality thus is not a source but a target or main direction of the the process of cognition and volition, this process being understood as controlling the conceptual system by its subject.

The use of notional (conceptual) means is not exclusive; within the limits of the principles of subjectivity and relativity other means may be used to attain absolute ideals and values, e.g. artistic means are used in painting or sculpture to achieve the ideal of beauty etc.

II. Main concepts of noetics

1. Conceptual system, conceptual formation

In the same manner as matter is based on atoms and life on cells, thinking is based on conceptual systems (CS).

The subject creates CS as a subjective instrument for pursuing specific tasks in the direction of reality, especially its cognition and realization of desired goals; CS is a basic unit, a monade, to which must needs relate and evaluate, within the limits of which is every conceptual formation valid (principle of relativity of CS).

The criteria of truth (rightness) are therefore exclusively the problem of a specific CS. The truth within one conceptual sphere, or "language" of one CS need not be valid in another CS (e.g. every science creates its definition of reality and subject, every legal system formulates its own definition of fraud etc.). Thus aristotelian logic is valid within one CS only but in relation to other CS Protagoras' relativism holds.

The basic element of a CS is so-called <u>conceptual formation (CF)</u>, so that a CS may be defined also as a <u>set of conceptual formations</u>. The proper functionality of a given CS is fulfilled by <u>functional CFs</u>, called <u>sentences</u>. The basic building stone of a functional CF is a <u>nominal CF</u>, denoting a certain sphere of reality, called also <u>term</u>. Terms may be e.g. "tree" and "green", a sentence with a cognitive function is "tree is green".

It is necessary to point out that this notion of thinking is purely noetical, within the conceptual sphere of noetics. Irrespective of this specific sciences may understand thinking within their conceptual sphere differently, e.g. neurophysiology or psychology as a psychophysical phenomenon of a specific human being, legal science as a legal system etc.

2. Controlling of CS by its subject

According to abovementioned principles the subject creates its CS as a set of CFs, and controls it intentionally as a subjective thinking instrument, i.e. adapts it to the solution of given tasks, especially by adapting its behavior and structure. Subjectivism and relativism, which are only able to solve abovementioned skeptical questions, are not to be understood as libertarianism or despotism of the subject, but as intentional adaptation of his thinking to the goals pursued, especially cognition of reality and realization of desired tasks.

According to the subjective principle the subject does not passively reflect the cognized reality, but actively adapts his thinking to this reality. For instance certain reality may be cognized as a "green tree" only after the subject has equipped his CS actively with the terms "green" and "tree", and by their connection with an algorithm of using the sentence "tree is green". Without creation of such subjective instruments it is not possible for the subject to cognize such reality as "green tree". At the same time, according to the relativity principle such sentence is valid only within such CS, which approaches the cognition of reality with such terms.

Also this notion of control is to be understood exclusively within the conceptual sphere of noetics. Other specific sciences may create their own notions of control, e.g. economics, legal science, technical sciences etc.

3. Subject of Conceptual System

Subject may be defined as the <u>controlling center of a CS</u>. Each CS has a controlling subject which is bearer of its subjectivity and relativity. From his control decisions both the functionality of the whole CS and the validity of its CFs are derived.

This is however purely noetic definition of the subject. It is self-evident, that according to the principles of subjectivity and relativity certain CSs (especially scientific) may create their own notions and definitions of subject, and understand e.g. psychophysical individual, organisation (enterprise, state, church) as a subject. This notion is however governed by controlling function of that subject which has created this notion or definition.

4. Reality as main direction of controlling the CS by its subject

As shown already above reality may be defined as main direction of control of the CS by its subject. Reality thus is neither the objectivist source of our cognition nor the pursued goals just the starting point of our volition, but it is the aim, or main direction, to which the subject adapts its thinking by his own means in order to cognize or realize it.

Also this definition of reality is understandably purely noetic. It is then the problem of the controlling function of the subject, e.g. science, to create within the conceptual sphere of his CS his own notion and definition of reality and understand it as e.g. nature, ideal sphere, society, economic relations, legal system etc. In the same manner these definitions and notions are then governed by the controlling function of the subject which created them in his CS using the principles of relativity and subjectivity.

III. Two main spheres of controlling CS by its subject: cognition and volition

1. Cognition and volition

The subject considers coordination of his CS with reality his main task in controlling the CS. It may principially take two directions. If the subject coordinates his thinking with reality by its adaptation by subjective means we call this <u>cognition</u>. If , on the other hand, he tries to adapt the reality to his thinking, to realize it, we call it <u>volition</u>. Cognition and volition are thus two effects of one activity of the subject, controlling the CS and its coordination with reality, but in two respective directions.

2. Cognitive and volitive CSs

According to this we have to differentiate the CSs of the subject. Those destined for cognition of reality we call <u>cognitive</u>, those destined for realization of pursued goals are called volitive.

In the same manner we differentiate conceptual forms as basic building stones of a given CS: <u>Terms</u> split into <u>concepts</u> in the sphere of cognition and <u>ideas</u> in the sphere of volition, <u>sentences</u> split into cognitive <u>judgements</u> and volitive <u>norms</u>. The <u>judgement states</u> that the reality <u>is</u>, the <u>norm orders</u> that the reality is <u>to be</u>. Judgement is e.g. "tree is green", as it it an act of cognition, a statement derived by subjective means from the reality, which would not be valid if the real tree were not green. norm is e.g. "obligations are to be fulfilled", this being an act of volition, intended to be implemented in reality, and valid as a duty irrespective of specific situation in the fulfillment of obligations.

Decisive for such differentiation is by no means the grammar of a given CF, but exclusively its function, whether cognitive or volitive, whether intended to cognize or realize reality. For instance the sentence "criminal acts are punished by law" may be valid as a judgement, if just stating the fact, or a norm, if given to the respective authorities as an obligation.

3. Intellect, will

Such a differentiation we may recognize also in the subject. The subject as a controlling center of a cognitive CS is called <u>intellect</u>, in a volitive CS <u>will</u>. The subject as an intellect cognizes reality, as a will realizes it.

4. Entity, ideality

At the same time reality as a main direction of controlling the CS by its subject differentiates into cognized (entity) and desired (ideality). The subject cognizes entity and desires to realize ideality. The aim of the cognitive process is cognition, the aim of the volitive process efficiency.

IV. Reality and its relative comprehension

1. Transit sphere of reality, perception, action

According to the abovementioned principles reality ceases to be the exclusive source of our cognition and volition, but turns into the main direction of the control of the CS, this

being the task or goal, to which the subject aims his cognition and volition in the same manner, as e.g. a painter aims his painting technique using his means to reflect a given reality. Protagoras' "man is measure of all things" is not to be understood as wilfullness, but rather as an intentionally controlled set of such "measures" adapted to pursued aims.

Reality as a goal, main direction of controlling the CS by its subject is, however, not fully accessible to the subject in terms of space and time. Thus the subject may in the process of coordination with reality connect its thinking most reliably only to such reality, which is fully accessible and available. This sphere we call "transit reality", as it is passed through by the process of coordination, and in the cognitive sphere it is perception of the subject, in the volitive sphere his action. The subject may most reliably cognize the reality by means of his perception and realize his volition by means of his action. There are of course other means of coordination with reality, such as perception and action of other people, data or actions of mechanisms etc., but here the subject has in the name of reliability to create at least indirect feedback of his own perception in the cognitive sphere and his own action in the volitive sphere.

At the same time own perception is to be understood not as a part of the subject, but as a sphere of reality, because it has to be perceived and evaluated by the subject together with the rest of reality.

2. Coordinative sphere of the CS, experience, practice

Thus originates a sphere within the CS directly connected to the perception or action of the subject. This sphere is called in the first case <u>experience (empirical)</u>, in the second case <u>practice</u>. These spheres are called <u>coordinative</u> because of their function in coordinating thinking with reality. Against the transit reality (perception, action), which is raw and has to be transformed into the relativistic order of a given CS, this sphere has the advantage of being already a part of the CS and its order. Because of this position to the privileged sphere of reality, which is most reliably accessible to the subject (perception, action), it may fulfill the function of a specific criterion of success of the coordination of thinking and reality. According to this criterion the subject requires, that each valid CF of a given CS be in accord with it either directly (within the empirical or practical sphere of the CS) or at least indirectly (by means of other CFs of this CS within other parts of the CS).

It is self-evident that such criteria, just like other CFs of the CS, are in the sense of the subjectivity and relativity of the control of the CS (within the conceptual sphere, or "language" of the CS), fully subjective and relative, valid only within the CS using them, even if they may relate to the same reality as other CSs.

3. Absolute reality (Being, Good, God)

We have demonstrated that both cognition and realization of reality is dependent on conceptual equipment of the respective CS in the process of its control by its subject; any truth or rightness is therefore dependent from the level of the respective CS, which has only subjective means to achieve this. No CS can step out of itself and cognize or realize absolute reality (Being in the sphere of cognition, Good in the sphere of volition), this being the reality which exists "by itself" outside every CS but valid as an absolute main direction of control for every CS; every reality is cognizable or realizable only up to the level of the conceptual equipment of a given CS.

About absolute reality we cannot therefore tell anything, even whether it exists or not, whether it is essentially material or spiritual etc., because any such description pulls it into the conceptual sphere of the CS, which is a contradiction. There is therefore no other way than to develop patiently by subjective means own CS, especially that parts which have approached it nearest (sciences, orders).

The question of the essence of the absolute reality (Being, Good) may therefore be the subject of <u>faith</u>. Even such sciences and orders, the instruments of which are more accomplished, elaborate and effective for attaining the absolute, can only approach it indirectly by subjective and relative path. Even they may only <u>believe</u>, that this path is in accordance and may lead them to this goal. Thus we may state that faith is not absolutely opposed to science, but is its necessary prerequisite and condition; science is qualified faith.

This absolute reality (Being, Good) we may comprehend as <u>God</u>. It is evident that even if God acts as a main direction to which all our thinking (both cognition and volition) aims by means of subjective mesures (subjective cognition, subjective good), from the point of view of currrent state of our CS we may tell nothing about him, but only believe in him. We can neither prove his existence nor non-existence, or define his essence, because God as an absolute entity exists otside the capabilities of any CS, while any proof or definition is valid only within a specific CS. We may only vaguely state that God as a trinity (God, Being, Good) is a model for the functions of the subject (subject, intellect, will). He does not give concrete commands, but it is in the highest interest of man to follow the path to him, because absolute Truth and Good is in him, even if man has only subjective means to do this. The command of Christ "love your neighbour", also based on the principle of subjectivity, because it turns to single human beings, is then the most reliable path to achieve this.

Even if we understand God as an absolute reality wholly independent of our thinking, the <u>concept</u> of God as a CF is fully created by the subject. It is therefore subjected to the noetical principles of subjectivity, relativity and control and is valid only within the CS which works with it.

The expression "One God" means, that in his absolute unity dissolve any so-called absolute systems of human mind, especially so-called ideas (e.g. justice) just like any relative creations of human CS, even if of highest order.

It is necessary to remind also here that this notion of God is purely noetic, from noetical standpoint. At the same time different CSs may within their subjectivity and relativity create their own notions of God, as known from different religions, churches and other theistical or atheistical systems. Their dogmas must be though in accord with scientific noetics as top-level methodology, valid for every CS.

<u>4. Conceptologic and materialistic notions of reality, pure and impure conceptologic sciences, material sciences.</u>

The subject while controlling its CS creates in his CS a system of CFs, especially categories, concepts, axioms, principles etc. These may be of two kinds: conceptologic and material.

Conceptologic CFs are intended for cognition of ideal reality, i.e. conceptual (e.g. concepts of CF, CS, truth, rightness etc.), and he operates with them in <u>conceptologic sciences</u>. Material CFs are intended for cognition of other reality, i.e. material (e.g. concepts of time, space, matter, causality) and he operates with them in <u>material sciences</u>.

The sphere of intellect may be examined by the subject according to relativity and subjectivity principles using dual approach:

- <u>purely conceptological approach</u> is used to examine conceptual systems, if examined exclusively by conceptological CFs. As we exclude in the name of purity the use of material CFs, especially the categories of existence and causality, we examine these CFs purely by their own internal rules with no dependencies on the material sphere. Such approach is used by purely conceptological sciences, e.g. pure legal theory examines legal systems exclusively from the point of view of the legal authority regardless from the economic and political structure of the society creating this legal system.
- within the limits of his control authority inside the CS the subject does, however, use also other possibilities, i.e. examines the mind as a part of the material sphere, derived from its laws, especially using the category of existence and the principle of causality. This is done by the <u>impure conceptologic sciences</u>. Such science understands e.g. the subject as a social being, whose thinking is determined by social reality, economic or political system etc. While purely conceptological legal science examines the legal system as a CS derived purely from the will of the controlling legal subject (the state), impure conceptological legal science examines the legal system as a part of social reality derived from and determined by social (economic, political) circumstances.

Also here it is evident that such plurality of views is not contradictory, but is a consequence of the notion of controlling the CS by its subject, especially the principles of subjectivity and relativity of the CS.

5 The meaning of purely conceptological examination of intellect

Noetical notion of thinking as controlling the CS by its subject means, that we understand it (including the categories of controlling, subject, reality etc.) purely conceptologically, i.e. based on the relations within the CS itself. We do not take into account the cognition of material relations within the cognized reality, because this is the task of other, especially material, sciences, which cognize reality by means of material categories (existence, matter, causality, time, space etc.).

The subject creates in a subjective and relative way concepts and judgements about the cognized reality, does not however create the reality on the material side as the subjective idealists say. This is governed by material relations cognized by other material sciences.

So if material science examines with its subjective and relative intellectual instruments the reality using the category of existence, then it materially follows (even if relatively in relation to this CS) that reality exists. If the reality is also examined using the category of causality, then within the causal chain is valid, that reality is objective, existing independently of man, has existed before him etc.

Also here are therefore the views of subjectivity and relativity of our cognition and the notion of objective reality existing independently of us not contradictory, but in accord, being the consequences of two different notions of the examination of reality, these being on different planes, but derived from the one governing principle, that of controlling the CS by its subject.

6. Noetics as science about the rules of controlling the CS by its subject

Noetics then has the task to examine the methodology of thinking, i.e. the basic rules of the controlling the CS by its subject. It has therefore to start with the purely conceptological notion, which means with the conceptologic categories (CF, CS, truth, rightness etc., or possibly purely conceptologic notions of existence, subject, control). In no case it may uncritically use material categories (existence, causality, matter, finality, space, time etc.), because these categories it has first to set up methodologically. Noetics does not therefore concern itself with the material conditions of the existence of reality, but with conceptual conditions, under which we may truly postulate that reality, space, time exist independently of our intellect.

Disregarding this a material CS may build its own notion and definition of reality, subject, control or intellect using material categories, e.g. psychology examines intellect on the basis of causal dependence on the rest of reality, sociology in relation to society etc. They may even create a material theory of cognition (e.g. marxist theory of reflection).

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Methodologically they should have had their categories set up by the methodologic conceptual science, the noetics.

Noetics examining the process of thinking in cognition we call <u>gnoseology</u>, in the realm of volition <u>volitology</u>.

IV. Control spheres within a given CS, unity of CS.

In the process of controlling, i.e. determining the structure and behavior of his CS, the subject tries to achieve maximum effectivity and reliability of its work, i.e. that it not only functionally solve given tasks (especially cognition of reality and realization of volition), but that it be as an intellectual instrument possibly best determined, clearly and simply organized etc. One of the most important tasks and principles followed by the subject is unity of the CS.

To achieve this unity the subject anchors in his CS using his control authority so-called <u>control spheres</u>, which determine the position of each CF of his CS to be dependent on another, superior CF. Thus the subject creates in his CS interconnected harmonic unity, where the position of every CF is derived from the position of superior CF, up to the top-level CFs in this sense (categories in terms and axioms in sentences), these being derived directly from the control function of the relevant CS.

The control spheres are aimed by the subject especially in these directions:

- <u>formal control sphere</u> is oriented on formal control of own CS, especially on its formal structure,
- <u>imanent control sphere</u> secures material control of the CS, in relation to reality, by the means of internal, imanent control CFs,
- <u>coordinative control sphere</u> secures the control of CS related to the transition sphere of reality, on perception or action, on experience or practice of the subject.

The control spheres use the subject in two manners, fulfilling the tasks both in the spheres of structure and behavior of a given CS,

- as <u>criteria</u> governing whether a certain CF is to be understood as a valid part of the CS (<u>validity</u>),
- as directives governing further building of the CS.

1. Criteria (reasons) of validity of CFs, truth, rightness

The subject creates first of all so-called <u>criteria</u> or <u>reasons of validity</u>, which all CFs must respect which want to be a part of a given CS.

- <u>formal criteria</u> securing formal structure of CS and constituting formal validity of CS. In the realm of cognitive CSs these are <u>logical</u> criteria, desribed by logic, in the volitive realm these are <u>normologic criteria</u>, described by normology, which is a subset of logic.
- imanent criteria, securing internal content structure of CS and constituting imanent validity of CFs. Such criteria are more oriented to the fulfilling of proper functions of CS in the direction of reality, but are still derived from the internal, imanent sphere of CS. From reality itself (eventually from its transit sphere) they are derived only indirectly by the means of adapting them to this reality by the subject, which is actually unable to derive them directly (e.g. mathematics is derived from axioms within the CS, even if it must correspond to real relationships of numbers, because the subject has been adapting them to this purpose for a long time).

Imanent criteria are called <u>theoretical</u> in the cognitive sphere and are examined especially by theoretical sciences, in the volitive sphere they are called <u>normative</u> and are described by general normative CSs (e.g. laws).

- coordinative criteria, securing coordinative functions of CS, i.e. feedback to the transit sphere of reality and also cognitive function and effectiveness of a CS, they constitute so-called coordinative validity of a CF. In the cognitive sphere they are called empirical, being directly based on experience and perception of the subject, in the volitive sphere they are called practical, being directly connected to practice or action of the subject, thus evaluating their efficiency. They are examined by empirical CSs and CFs (empirical sciences) in the cognitive sphere and described by practical (executive) CSs and CFs (e.g. legal systems) in the volitive sphere.

According to coordinative criteria every CF has to be in accord, directly or at least indirectly (via other CFs within the union CS), with experience (cognitive) or practice (volitive). Here we should mention the key role of experiment, from which the subject deduces relationships from directly inaccessible reality e.g. by instrument readings which may be verified by his own perception.

In the volitive sphere e.g. a general law has to be in accord with best legal practice, actions of real persons, and thus fulfill the tasks pursued by the legal authority.

The subject uses in his CS as coordinative criteria mostly feeedback to his own perception or action. As his abilities and possibilities are limited he is willing to accept also perception and action of other subjects, eventually also actions of mechanisms etc., but he makes sure that these are related at least indirectly to his own actions or perception through abovementioned CFs. So the subject is willing to trust reality, which he cannot verify by own experience, from the reports of other subjects, if he reads about it in a trustworthy journal or book which for him guarantee the validity of such data. In the same manner a legal authority supports the efficiency of a law governing the actions of

other subjects by a system of executive, supervisory and sanctional norms governing the actions of subjects which he personally can influence (his executive bodies).

Every CF which is in accord with such criteria (is valid formally, imanently and coordinatively) is called <u>true</u> in cognitive sphere and <u>right</u> in volitive. In this manner true knowledge must be proved by formal logic, must be in accord with the corresponding theory and based on experience at least indirectly through other CFs in a given CS. In the same manner a right norm expresssing the volition of the subject has to be based on proper normative logic, has to agree with the respective normal sphere (e.g. law) and based on practice, which also means on actions of the subject at least indirectly through other CFs within the union CS.

<u>Truth</u> therefore represents the unity of a cognitive CS, <u>rightness</u> represents the union of a volitive CS. It is evident that truth and rightness are not objectivist categories but are derived from the control function of the subject over his CS, indirectly from own experience, this being the main direction of the control process. Thus every truth and rightness is only subjective and relative, every CF is true or right only according to the criteria of his own CS.

2. Directives for creation of CFs inside CS, deduction, induction.

In addition to validity criteria the control spheres act also as <u>directives</u> for creation of further CFs inside the CS. The subject acts in this process in a twofold way:

- while formal criteria control further building of the CS methodologically, the progress of building from imanent (theoretical, normative) criteria is called <u>deduction</u>,
- -on the other hand, progress from coordinative criteria (experience, practice) inside the CS is called <u>induction</u>.

The development of the building of a given CS then consists of alternating these ways and is called <u>dialectics</u>. In the interest of keeping the top-level law of unity of this CS within its functionality the subject uses the elements of

- subjectivism and objectivism,
- apriorism and aposteriorism,
- deduction and induction.

In the dialectical process the subject first of all develops his imanent (theoretical or normative) criteria as directives for further progress and confronts the result with the coordinative criteria (experience, practice). Then in the interest of attaining the unity of his CS he modifies all arising contradictions. With thus developed CS as an apriori

instrument he approaches the reality in order to cognize or realize it. The results attained in the realm of experience or practice he then develops further as coordinative directives by induction, and thus attained aposteriori result he again coordinates with imanent and formal criteria; the contradictions he then modifies to attain the desired unity. This all he repeats on a higher level etc.

Thus the CS gradually develops and perfects itself by the way of dialectical development from its primitive beginnings to current complicated objective systems which are able to solve complicated tasks of cognition and volition of the subject.

3. Historical process of the control of the CS, objectivisation of the CS, sciences, orders.

Man in his own innermost interest strives to achieve full cognition of reality and perfect good, and this from the beginning of his development. As these values are in their absolute forms out of his reach, he has no other possibility than to approach them by subjective means, especially by the development and perfection of his intellect, his CS. Thus at the beginning the CSs were primitive and influenced by their subjective origins, their knowledge and experience was personal, subjective, unordered, is interests were narrowly personal and egoistic. These were however starting points for further development, perfection and deepening, and in this manner has man developed current, incomparably more perfect CSs.

In its origin every CS is a subjective and relative product of the control of its subject. In the process of development the subject found out that it is much more advantageous to unite his strength in controlling his CS with other subjects, so that he may use also other experience and multiply his effort of developing his CS. In the sphere of cognition he may link up with thousands of years of experience of previous generations, in the realm of volition he may satisfy his desires much more effectively if cooperating with other subjects in the interests of a group or society.

Thus the subject may in the process of dialectical development develop his CS to a higher level of quality, where his CS has perfectly worked out the three criteria, namely formal, imanent and coordinative, so that the subject is able to coordinate his intellect quite perfectly with reality, i.e. to cognize reality and realize the goals pursued. In this manner so-called <u>objective CSs</u> were created, which are called <u>sciences</u> in cognitive sphere and orders in volitive sphere.

For the reasons of higher perfection they achieve <u>objective truth (rightness)</u>, because their criteria are so perfect that they are able to cognize reality and realize goals nearly perfectly, and as they are recognized by major part of society they have universal validity. Such recognition has for instance the world science, which is respected and applied by all civilized world, or legal systems, which are used by major parts of society, nations, states.

Even then, if such CSs are recognized as objective, their truth is still subjective by origin and development. By no means it is absolute truth which is still the goal of the control of the CS by its subject. Objective truth in this manner is only more perfect subjective truth, objective good is only more perfect and deepened subjective good.

4. Relations between respective CSs

Absolute reality (Being, Good) is not directly accessible to the subject, so that he has no other option than to approach it by subjective and relative means (subjective knowledge, subjective interests), by controlling and further developing his CS. From this principle of subjectivity and relativity then follow relations of man to reality and also between men.

Relations of man to other people are necessarily governed by relativity, plurality, freedom and tolerance. At the same time absolute reality, independent of us, stands to our intellect as obligatorily unmoving, dominant point; to this point man has absolute obligations and responsibilities, because attaining of absolute truth and good is impressed to everyone and stands as his most natural interest.

By the relativity of truth and rightness mutual plurality evidently exists between respective CSs. No CS is necessarily predestined to be absolutely obligatory, all CSs have the possibility to compete mutually for assertion, in which competition such CS wins, which best fulfills the tasks of cognizing reality and realizing volition. This relativity of truth and rightness does in no case mean absolutization of plurality, but the necessity of evaluating the degree of fulfillment of the tasks in relation to reality. Thus relaitivity, plurality and freedom of human intellect does not mean absolute equality of all views and truths, but only differentiation according to their abilities of cognition and realization, by which the less perfect are to be rejected, the more perfect are to be accepted and developed further. The rejection of a less perfect system is advantageous also for him who has previously defended it, because by acceptance of a more perfect system he gets to a higher level. He certainly loses if he sticks to his former views appealing to relativity of thinking, and plurality and freedom of views. The principle of subjectivity and relativity constitutes therefore a basis for peace and tolerance, because it removes absolutist antagonism of irreconcilable views and stresses their common path to attainment of common Good and Being. On this way these absolute values do not actually directly order anything to a human being, but lead only indirectly by demonstrating where he errs by contradictions in his subjective efforts.

VI. Classification of Conceptual Systems

As mentioned above, it is not possible to absolutize the relativity and the resulting plurality of truths, but any CS has to be evaluated and differentiated according to its ability to fulfill the tasks of cognition and realization of reality and at the same time also other criteria: functionality, simplicity, clarity, unity etc.lt is evident that the CS of

common man will be on other level than the perfect systems of objective sciences or orders. We will therefore limit our classification to these.

1. Classification of sciences

Sciences should be differentiated according to their object of research and methods used.

a) conceptological sciences examine the realm of conceptual systems from the standpoint of the principle of control, which is a purely conceptological point of view, meaning system's own internal rules. They do not concern themselves with intellect as a part of material world, i.e. from the standpoint of material dependencies, especially the category of causality. This undertake so-called impure conceptological sciences, which we therefore classify as material sciences.

Conceptual sciences are further divided into

- <u>noetics</u>, examining general rules of controlling the CS by its subject, i.e. the rules of their structure and behavior, and having two branches, gnoseology and volitology;
- <u>formal sciences</u>, examining formal, ordering rules of structuring the CS by its subject. Here belongs first of all logic, encompassing usually also normology as a special discipline, which concerns itself with the order of volitive CSs or volition.

While noetics examines general rules of the control of CSs, logic is concerned with special rules of the formal arrangement of the CS as made by the subject. While noetics examines the whole functionality of the CS, logic discovers only the rules of their formal arrangement. Therefore within one general noetics may exist, according to the relativity of CSs, more logical systems.

- dogmatic sciences, examining concrete CSs; these may be
 - cognitive, examining specific cognitive CS (history of science);
- <u>volitive</u>, examining specific volitive CSs, either <u>normative</u> (e.g. legal systems), or <u>practical</u> (e.g. technologies).

As the volitive dogmatic sciences examine norms using judgements as their instrument, they have necessarily judgments on norms as their main content.

b) <u>material sciences</u>, examining the material world by means of material categories (mathematic relations, existence, causality, finality, space, time etc.) Here belong also the <u>impure conceptological sciences</u>, examining the intellect as a part of this world, being subjected to its laws, using material categories.

We differentiate them into

- <u>exact or theoretical sciences</u>, derived from imanent or theoretical control sphere of the CS (mathematics, theoretical physics). Even if they are derived directly from the theoretical sphere of the CS, they must also be in accord with empirical criteria at least indirectly, by means of other CFs within the unity of the CS (e.g. real numerical or geometrical relationships in mathematics),
- <u>empirical</u>, examining emprirical data on reality, derived directly from experience. Here belong e.g. natural or sociological sciences.

We do not include <u>philosophy</u> (<u>metaphysics</u> in cognitive sphere) to sciences, as it does not have sufficient feedback to experience. In spite of this philosophy has an important social role as an indicator of social solutions in their generality, even if in special cases it is not valid and must admit exceptions.

2. Classification of orders

Also orders are divided according to their object of realization, which they should realize (modify, create, order etc.)

- a) conceptological orders containing rules for ordering the CS. These are especially
 - noetical, securing methodologically general functionality of the CS,
- <u>logical including normological</u>, by which the subject controls formal ordering of the CS.
- b) material orders, ordering material reality. These are especially
- <u>exact or normative</u>, derived directly by the control principle from the imanent (normative) sphere of the volitive CS, with no connection to volitive practice (e.g. legal system as a volitive CS, as a set of laws derived from the controlling will of a legal authority). Even if these systems are derived directly from the the imanent sphere of the volitive CS, they must have at least indirect connection to the practical, executive sphere, which ensures desired efficiency;
- <u>executive or practical</u>, containing specific rules for controlling practical activities. According to the object of realization these may be <u>natural orders</u>, e.g. technological procedures, <u>sociological</u>, e.g. economic directives etc.

Here do not belong <u>philosophical or ethical</u> systems, which do not have sufficiently perfect practical criteria, i.e. unambiguous feedback to specific actions, and therefore are not sufficiently effective. In spite of this they have an important social role as an

indicator of solutions of ethical problems, even if in special cases they are not valid and must admit exceptions.

Conclusion - solution of the problem

From this standpoint may be solved also the abovementioned noetical (critical, skeptical, solipsist, agnostical) problems.

Absolute reality (Being, Good or possibly God) is not directly accessible to us, it is a main direction or goal to which the subject directs his efforts by controlled evolution, adaptation of his CS by subjective and relative means. He uses his CS of which he cannot in any case step out. The level of cognition and volition is therefore determined by the level of the specific CS which desires it.

Solipsist theory may be overcome only by a subjectivist notion of thinking. It states that the category of existence is to be understood and defined in that manner which the subject (man, science) has assigned to it, that means that it is to be considered a part of a given objective CS (science) together with other categories (causality, finality, time, space etc.), and this according to the rules of the control of the CS, which are examined by noetics as a methodologic science. According to this subjectivist notion of existence science may truly declare (if only relative to the respective CS) that the world with other people exists independently of man, that it has existed before and will exists after.

In the same manner we may solve Hume's skeptical reasoning about the principle of causality, which is not valid absolutely, but may be used as an instrument subjective by origin but objective by meaning, relativistically valid within that CS which uses it to access reality. It certainly is not valid absolutely just like any other principle.

It is evident that the principle of controlling the CS by its subject may very usefully solve certain basic questions which current philosophy, using objectivist notion of thinking, cannot solve. May this notion contribute to fulfilling of the Philosopher's vision: "If a tiny piece of understanding touches my intellect, my head burns, this world disappears, and I see only the merry faces of men who are recovering; they comprehend everything, they understand and love each other, because they see that the highest goal led them all." (*Emanuel Radl: Consolation from philosophy*). What more may we desire?