In the world of contemporary American politics, the "conservative movement" continues to figure prominently as a force that is, for all practical purposes, inseparable from the Republican Party. As the 2016 presidential election cycle gets under way, well over a dozen Republican contenders are laboring tirelessly to establish their "conservative" bona fides. In truth, however, neither the "conservative" movement nor most "conservative" politicians are conservative at all. Rather, they are neoconservative, and between neoconservatism and traditional or classical conservatism there is all of the difference, a difference in kind. In this paper, I cite both scholarly and popular representatives of both traditions of thought to show that each depends upon epistemological, ontological, and ethical-political suppositions that are not only fundamentally distinct from, but radically at odds with, those of the other.

The contribution points to the current position (role) of transdisciplinary approach in science, which highlights the need, importance and reason for inter- and transdisciplinary collaboration across the humanities and natural sciences. The interpretation is based on fundamental ideological foundations of philosophy and methodology of science and puts the issue into a broader computerization context, or so-called information society, which creates new (virtual) worlds (as products of a constructive type of rationality). Described development in science entails a change of approach to education. The foreground is now (again) the question of multidisciplinary educated man.

This study ("On the concept of natural law - of human being - in Hobbes´ philosophy") is an appendix to my studies on development of the concept of law (of being) in classical modern philosophy. What is the position of natural law (of human being) in Hobbes´ philosophy in development of the concept of law (of being) in classical modern philosophy? If Hobbes´ concept of natural law (of human being) is a concept of moral law (of human being) as Hobbes himself declares does it mean that Hobbes´ concept of natural law (of human being) anticipates e. g. Kant´s concept of moral law (of human being)? There is defined Hobbes´ concept of natural law (of human being) in this study, namely by demonstration of Hobbes´ conception of essential source, (essential) contents, (essential) form, and validity (liability) of natural law (of human being). Natural law (of human being) according to Hobbes may be formulated by the following way: Act in such a way so that you can always keep both your own life and life of other people. As far as to keep both one´s own life and life of other people presupposes to keep peace among people (in human society) if it is possible, and if it is not possible to keep peace among people (in human society) it pressuposes to search for allies for fight angainst enemies, thus far natural law (of human being) according to Hobbes may be formulated by the following way, too: If it is possible act in such a way so that you can always keep peace among people (in human society); if it is not possible to keep peace among people (in human society) search allies for fight against enemies. There is defined Hobbes´ concept of positive civil law (of human being in state and legal social form) in this study, too, namely by demonstration of Hobbes´ conception of essential source, (essential) contents, (essential) form, and validity (liability) of positive civil law (of human being in state and legal social form), as well as of his conception of relation between natural law (of human being) and positive civil law (of human being in state and legal social form). Furthermore, Hobbes´ concept of natural law (of human being) as well as Hobbes´ concept of positive civil law (of human being in state and legal social form) and his conception of relation between natural law (of human being) and positive civil law (of human being in state and legal social form) are scarified. The main points of their scarifiing are as follows: 1. Hobbes´ concept of natural law (of human being) is different from any concept of moral law (of human being) because of not being based on reason of ethical and practical type and (therefore) not having any form of categorical imperativ; it has a form of hypothetical imperativ and it is based on reason of vital and practical type: it means that Hobbes´ concept of natural law (of human being) must be different from any concept of moral law (of human being). (To save always human life is not always the same as to serve always to human being.) 2. Furthermore, natural law (of human being) according to Hobbes is representated by positive civil law (of human being in state and legal social form); however, being representated is here (according to Hobbes) the same as being eliminated: the man as a citizen of state (Commonwealth) is owed only to positive civil laws (of

The article recapitulates the basic foundations of the thoughts of Alfred Schütz who tries to synthesize the approaches of Edmund Husserl and Max Weber in the field of the methodology of the social sciences. Although Schütz follows Husserlian phenomenological approach very closely in the early period of his work, it is already possible to see a specific emphasis on empirical character of any scientific investigation. This emphasis is inspired by the Weberian arguments and opposes the opinion of another from Schütz's great teachers - Ludwig von Mises. The article gradually analyses the key features of Schütz's own method and shows the fundamental importance of typification and anonymisation in our everyday as well as scientific knowledge of the world we live in. Schütz arrives from the phenomenological starting points to the problematic of Weber's ideal types and at the end on the ground of Austrian economics represented by von Mises where he tries to modify some of Mises' unattainable thoughts regarding the fundamental division between theoretical and historical branches of social science.

This paper is the result of the collaboration with Dr. Khroutski for several years. The presented analysis (and synthesis) firstly aims at reflecting common points that belong to both approaches (of BioCosmology and Informational Anthropology), chiefly in the aspect of fundamental (ontological and gnoseological) issues. Likewise, this work illustrates the fact that modern culture has arrived at the recognition threshold (in our knowledge) of realizing new real exploratory approaches that are capable of obtaining the true universalizing knowledge, first of all in relation to a human being.

The aim of this work is to draw attention to some problems concerning fundamental values and their perception and enforcement in today's hectic, hyper-consumerist, and globalized society. It points out that development does not only have an upward trend, but also a downward one. Furthermore, the important role of philosophy is recalled, including ancient philosophy, which is often mistakenly considered "something already known that cannot surprise us with anything." The philosophy of values in ancient Greece is presented in the work of Plato, one of the most important philosophers, and his famous dialogue Phaedrus. The largest and main part of the essay is devoted to this dialogue. The Phaedrus, in which Plato, speaking through Socrates, attempts to capture and define the essence of beauty, is one of the most important and immortal works of world literature. In addition to Plato's view of "beauty," it explains the basic features of his philosophical system. The content of the dialogue is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of the parts of the soul and ideas. Plato also addresses his relationship to art and rhetoric, establishing the basic rules of rhetoric. Plato's conception of beauty and art is based on an objectively idealistic explanation of the world. Plato is a typical representative of axiological objectivism.

This paper is the result of the collaboration with Dr. Khroutski for several years has. The presented analysis (and synthesis) firstly aims at reflecting common points that belong to both approaches (of BioCosmology and Informational Anthropology), chiefly in the aspect of fundamental (ontological and gnoseological) issues. Likewise, this work illustrates the fact that modern culture has arrived at the recognition threshold (in our knowledge) of realizing new real exploratory approaches that are capable of obtaining the true holistic, unity knowledge, first of all in relation to a human being.

An application of findings of cognitive science and neuroscience revealing function of brain processes can already introduce analytical tools for estimating human behavior in real environment. This paper reviews research of neural correlates of intertemporal decision making. The results show that intertemporal decision-making is not an integral phenomena as implied by the exponential discounting model, however it employs several distinct neural systems in the brain (e.g. the data shows the structural relevance of hyperbolic utility discounting) and causes that intertemporal decision-making focused on long term objectives is quantitatively different, as was also observed on impulsive preference reversals and lack of will-power phenomena. At the same time research in neuroeconomics shows the importance of subjective time-delays analysis in comparison with simple discounting of expected utility and points out that models integrating feelings of expectation i.e. anticipation (enjoyment, fear), which significantly impact the present utility magnitude, are correct. Nevertheless author admits that utilization of neuroeconomics is only potential for, to date, the research has not been able to answer economic questions in a better way than current purely economic research.

This article deals with causality as a methodological problem of economics. First it briefly overlooks causality as a philosophical concept. Then it engages in causality in economics from many points of view: (un)usefulness of causality in economics, individuals versus aggregates, causality in theoretical economics and complexity of economies, causality in empirical economics and econometrics. The article concludes that causality is a useful theoretical construction, but can not be revealed on the empirical level by using econometric techniques.

In what follows we outline Aristotle's philosophy of tragedy in his Poetics paying particular attention to his account of action and hamartia. We situate his account of tragedy in terms of his ethical philosophy and philosophy of action generally. We argue that tragedy is disclosive of the frailty of the human situation in its precarious contingence. By this, we link Aristotle's philosophy of tragedy to twentieth century aesthetic, ethical and European philosophy.

This paper introduces the notion of Recognition in the section of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit entitled 'A. INDEPENDENCE AND DEPENDENCE OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS: LORDSHIP AND BONDAGE' by way of a commentary. Hegel's view is that in order for any self-consciousness to obtain it must be acknowledged as such by another self-consciousness. For Hegel, acknowledgement emerges as a necessary condition for self-consciousness. As such, Hegel's account of self-consciousness raises the problem of intersubjectivity, or the account of the relation between more than one self-consciousness and I suggest, without attempting to establish, some intuitive lines of defence of the Hegelian position. I suggest that the dialectic of lordship and bondage, or as it is commonly referred to, the Master-Slave dialectic, cannot be fully comprehended without an adequate understanding of Hegel's account of Recognition.

Konstantin Khroutski envisions a new medical era or episteme in which health care will be devoted to the realization of each patient's whole-person needs, from biological to social, ultimately leading to their actualization as a human being. Commentator Anna Makolkin has pointed out that the transformation in medical culture is best addressed through an examination of the Greek concept of nous - mind and intellect. Aristotle's train of thought in his Physics, Metaphysics, and Generation of Animals, especially his analysis of the active and passive intellect, sheds light on the shifting modes of medical reasoning. Philosopher-physician Maimonides' medical writings also serve as exemplars of the flow of medical thought between organismic (humoral) and scientific traditions, leading to Khroutski's greater synthesis. The issue of a "Basic Cosmist Functionality" at the core of each person's state of health is addressed, drawing on three models - eventual, incremental, and teleologic. Aristotle's notions of cause and teleology suggest that a full model of health functionality will take into account momentary physiologic processes and include a teleologic element based on the individual's genotype and biotype. The paper concludes with an attempt to explain the notion of "cosmist functionality" held by Khroutski in terms of the omnipresent operation of the genome as well as the convergent nature of time for highly organized physical systems. The type of nous displayed by convergent natural processes is different, in terms of the incorporation of reflective consciousness, from human thought.

Several years before his death John Stuart Mill wrote three essays. His stepdaughter Helen Taylor edited these interesting essays in 1874 in London.
The article deals with some main problems which J. S. Mill analyzed in his texts, for example: the analysis of the concept of nature, considerations about the human nature and the role of understanding in the human knowledge, the problem of human rational and right action, the utility of religion (first of all of "religion of humanity"), the question of Naturam sequi as the fundamental principle of morals etc.
To considerate or to reflect on these ideas is an excellent oportunity for author of article to think about weak and strong points of Mill´s philosophical doctrine as well as to speculate about the importance of such problems in recent thinking.
In author´s opinion it is very good to take under considerations an older philosophical ideas for contemporary development of philosophical investigations and also it is the best celebration of philosopher´s anniversary. (Two centenary of the birth of J. S. Mill was in 2006.)

Lack of a coherent general starting point in consciousness studies is a major obstacle in explaining consciousness. I argue that consciousness considered as a capacity of a living organism is a fruitful explanandum. Consciousness is a reducible third person and first person phenomenon. It is existentially dependent on the activity of a nervous systém (brain) profoundly shaped by the socio-cultural environment. This paper rejects theoretical usefulness of ontological and epistemological gaps between first person and third person approaches on consciousness. Treating consciousness as a natural phenomenon open to empirical research is a necessary prerequisite of any systematic theory of consciousness.

In this essay I consider how Habermas and Foucault understand the nature of truth and reason in fundamentally different ways, and I argue that Habermas' misunderstanding of Foucault's position on these issues undermines his critique of Foucault. I argue that a strong response to Habermas' criticism is implicit in Foucault's work, and that this implicit response also offers us an occasion for reinterpreting all of Foucault's work as a single, unified project with roots in the Enlightenment.

Martyrdom involves a public sacrifice of one's own life in favor of a higher or transcendental cause. Acts of martyrs can change the world. The martyrdom of Vibia Perpetua in 203 can be seen as an act of Christian faith that overrode concerns for family, material security and individual survival. Perpetua was put to death for refusing to renounce her Christian faith and her diaries written in the days leading up to her execution are the oldest surviving texts by a Christian woman. Perpetua's story reflects the leadership role some women played in the early Christian church and gives insight into why Christianity came to take hold in the Roman Empire. Her story can also be interpreted as the effects of evolutionary psychology and memetics on human behaviour, effects so powerful that they can overcome even the interests of "the selfish gene." Perpetua's martyrdom may tell us as much or more about the power of memes as about the power of religious faith.

In this paper I examine how pragmatism-in the works of Peirce, James, Dewey, and Rorty-rejects foundationalism while not resorting to "radical relativism," in which no is no justifiable claim for a belief. Instead of attempting to establish antecedent, a priori, or eternal principles that make evident truths, goods, or justifications thereof, independent of experience, pragmatists look towards the consequent, effective result of the maintaining of a belief as criteria for its claim as truthful or good. They emphasize trial and error experimentation and continual reflection/revision of beliefs given new information and experiences. I argue this basic methodology not only avoids the pitfalls of foundationalism, but also affords a method by which one considers the means or path towards any end as having value in and of itself.

This paper seeks to formulate the idea of subjectless change in the established conceptual scheme, which is so often thought to necessarily exclude it. The idea, first espoused by some pre-Socratic thinkers in the form of the universal flux doctrine, was subsequently abandoned due to its alleged logical incoherence. Its reintroduction in contemporary metaphysics is essentially part of a massive revolt against the established conceptual scheme; it serves as a conceptual tool to reinterpret the world and to represent it in an entirely new picture. In this paper I argue, however, that the idea of subjectless change need not be associated with the dissolution of particulars or the dispensing with the concept of object, a trademark of the revolt; rather its usefulness lies in its explanatory power which renders presenting a more complete picture of the world in the established conceptual scheme possible.

In this paper I argue that interrogational torture is never morally justifiable. I highlight the many flaws inherent in using 'ticking-bomb' scenarios to justify the legalisation of torture in 'exceptional' circumstances. I argue that the damage that would be done to the ethical foundations of the state and the sanctity of the person should be sufficient to deter us from assuming that torture is ever morally permissible, or should be officially sanctioned. I further contend that the traditional scenarios used to justify arguments for the moral acceptability of torture suffer from the dual deficiency of abstraction and idealisation, and that lesser evil arguments are not sufficiently convincing when viewed in the light of the greater consequences of legalising brutality.

The advent of transgenic technologies have be a controversial area in science. For example critics argue that transgenics blurs the barrier between humans and animals. Another reason is that transgenics may diminish human belief of its superiority in the animal kingdom which has been asserted by various religious and philosophical worldviews. On the contrary, genetic research has brought to our attention of human similarity with the animal kingdom. The aim of this paper is to provide some philosophical understanding of transgenics and proffer new ways for exploring transgenics.

In the last four centuries there have been a number of cosmological and evolutionary insights which have informed our understanding of the architecture of the universe and life on earth. Nineteenth and twentieth century theories of evolution continued this speculative trend in relation to human evolution and emergence. Konstantin Khroutski's bio-cosmology paradigm offers a new insight into understanding biological and social processes. This paper provides a critical response of some areas of Khroutski's theory as well as will proposing new ways in which bio-cosmology can further contribute to evolutionary science.

In my previous articles to E-LOGOS (2001, 2002, 2003) I introduced the original conception of philosophical personalist cosmology (in the aspects of ontology, epistemology, philosophy of science, axiology) and the derived Cosmist theory and methodology. Now the urge is to deepen the exploration by explaining the epistematic (not epistemic) basic principles of my approach, aiming, ultimately, for attaining personal wellness and improving human health. In this way, the main goal of my undertaking lies in proposing a Cosmist episteme and the derived BioCosmology, which might shift the world science towards a universal level - from the modern unified understanding of the world (which the teleological "survival" is) to the future universal naturalist and personalist (a Cosmist episteme based) understanding of objective data and subjective experience, the latter being of primary significance. In the end, I cast light on the significance of Slavic civilization in realizing the universal (equitable appropriate favorable) world future. Meaningly, the vocabulary of Cosmist terms is presented at the end of the paper.

In my previous articles to E-LOGOS (2001, 2002, 2003) I introduced the original conception of philosophical personalist cosmology (in the aspects of ontology, epistemology, philosophy of science, axiology) and the derived Cosmist theory and methodology. Now the urge is to deepen the exploration by explaining the epistematic (not epistemic) basic principles of my approach, aiming, ultimately, for attaining personal wellness and improving human health. In this way, the main goal of my undertaking lies in proposing a Cosmist episteme and the derived BioCosmology, which might shift the world science towards a universal level - from the modern unified understanding of the world (which the teleological "survival" is) to the future universal naturalist and personalist (a Cosmist episteme based) understanding of objective data and subjective experience, the latter being of primary significance. In the end, I cast light on the significance of Slavic civilization in realizing the universal (equitable appropriate favorable) world future. Meaningly, the vocabulary of Cosmist terms is presented at the end of the paper.

Some interesting attempts to come to terms with a relevant consequences of cartesianism appeared during 17th century. One of these consequences was "the dualism", i.e. the opposition of body and mind.
Among many monistic solutions of cartesian "dualism" we find also the conception of english aristocrat Lady Anne Conway [1631-1679]. She is the author of no great writings The Principles of the most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, which was published posthumously in 1690.
This paper deals with the life and work of english women philosopher. Above all for czech readers it contains basic information for the first acquainting with her interesting conception of vitalistic and spritual monism, which was a counterbalance to pure mechanic explaining of the world and man in it.

Any attempt at scientific justification of the validity of the a priori economics or praxeology must face the danger of vicious circles coming from the fact that any science (including Hayek's evolutionary-aprioristic theory of neuronal networks as developed in his Sensory Order) is based on some a priori presuppositions. It is Hegel's conception of the spiral movement of the "experience of consciousness" (as applied originally in his Phenomenology of Spirit) which gives an efficient method of elimination of that kind of vicious circles; being aptly re-interpreted, it even enables to defend apriorism (in its evolutionary version) face to face the developments in modern physics which resulted in Einstein's theory of relativity and quantum mechanics. Consequently, evolutionary apriorism (as utilising the inspirations from the works of Hayek, Adam Smith, Hegel, Karel Engliš, etc.) is able to present scientific arguments in favour of the categorical statement that praxeology - as an a priori proto-science - is an indispensable basis for empirical economics.