E-LOGOS 2010, 17(1):1-7 | DOI: 10.18267/j.e-logos.273

Rawls' two principles of justice: their adoption by rational self-interested individuals in A Theory of Justice

Alexandra Dobra
Alexandra Dobra an editor for the IAPSS's academic journal Politikon, redactor for the academic journal ResPublica Nova (ENS de Paris), chapter chairman and founder for The Transatlantic (LSE; Oxford; SIPA; York).

Keywords: Two principles, contract argument, original position, veil of ignorance, difficulty, feasibility.

The present paper aims in a first stage, to exploit succinctly the cardinal argument - the contract argument - acquainted in "A Theory of Justice", which provides incentives for the two principles' general adoption. In a second stage, a discussion appraising the feasibility of these two principles and their subsequent empirical adoption will be dealt with. This contributes to the provision of counter-arguments and the highlighting of weaknesses.

Prepublished online: January 26, 2010; Published: June 1, 2010  Show citation

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Dobra, A. (2010). Rawls' two principles of justice: their adoption by rational self-interested individuals in A Theory of Justice. E-LOGOS17(1), 1-7. doi: 10.18267/j.e-logos.273
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