E-LOGOS 2010, 17(1):1-7 | DOI: 10.18267/j.e-logos.273
Rawls' two principles of justice: their adoption by rational self-interested individuals in A Theory of Justice
- Alexandra Dobra an editor for the IAPSS's academic journal Politikon, redactor for the academic journal ResPublica Nova (ENS de Paris), chapter chairman and founder for The Transatlantic (LSE; Oxford; SIPA; York).
Keywords: Two principles, contract argument, original position, veil of ignorance, difficulty, feasibility.
The present paper aims in a first stage, to exploit succinctly the cardinal argument - the contract argument - acquainted in "A Theory of Justice", which provides incentives for the two principles' general adoption. In a second stage, a discussion appraising the feasibility of these two principles and their subsequent empirical adoption will be dealt with. This contributes to the provision of counter-arguments and the highlighting of weaknesses.
Prepublished online: January 26, 2010; Published: June 1, 2010 Show citation
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