E-LOGOS 2013, 20(1):2-24 | DOI: 10.18267/j.e-logos.343

Filosofický problém svobodné vůle

Ondřej Havlíček
Department of Experimental Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilian-University of Munich, Austria

Problém svobodné vůle je tradičně považován za ryze metafyzický, a tedy neempirický. Díky současnému rozvoji kognitivních věd však narůstá množství argumentů založených na empirických poznatcích. Tento článek podává stručný přehled několika takových poznatků. Na jedné straně jde o výzkumy zabývající se otázkou kauzální potence vědomí a uvědomění si příčin svých akcí. Nejslavnější, avšak patrně nikoli nejvýznamnější, jsou zde bezpochyby experimenty Benjamina Libeta. Na druhé straně jde o zkoumání samotného prožitku svobodné agence. Zda danou akci vnímám jako svoji vlastní, závisí pravděpodobně na prediktivních i postdiktivních faktorech, o čemž svědčí situace, kdy podkladové kognitivní mechanismy selžou a vedou k omylům. Závěrem příspěvku je zamyšlení nad důsledky vědeckých poznatků pro různá pojetí svobodné vůle: libertariánské a kompatibilistické. Argumentuji ve prospěch smysluplnosti kompatibilistické koncepce svobodné vůle, proti které lze vést námitky spíše z pozice psychologie než neurověd.

Keywords: svobodná vůle, vědomí.

The free will problem has mostly been considered as a metaphysical one and hence non-empirical. However, with the recent developments in the cognitive sciences, claims about this philosophical issue are increasingly being made based on empirical findings. This paper gives a brief overview of a few of such findings. First, there are studies relevant to the question of causal efficacy of consciousness and the awareness of the causes of our actions. The most famous, although arguably not the most important ones, are the experiments of Benjamin Libet. Then there is a growing interest in the research on the experience of acting voluntarily. Whether I consider an action to be my own probably depends on predictive and postdictive factors, which is illustrated by the cases in which the underlying cognitive mechanisms lead to errors. Finally, the philosophical implications of these studies are discussed with regard to two basic conceptions of free will: libertarian and compatibilist. I argue that there is a meaningful notion of free will in the framework of compatibilism, which can be perhaps challenged by the findings of psychology rather than neuroscience.

Keywords: free will, consciousness.

Prepublished online: December 4, 2013; Published: June 1, 2013  Show citation

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Havlíček, O. (2013). Filosofický problém svobodné vůle. E-LOGOS, 20(1), 2-24. doi: 10.18267/j.e-logos.343
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