E-LOGOS 2014, 21(1):1-11 | DOI: 10.18267/j.e-logos.366

Infinitism and Dispositional Beliefs

Husein Inusah
Department of Classics and Philosophy, University of Cape Coast, Ghana

Keywords: infinitism, dispositional beliefs.

In articulating his theory of epistemic infinitism, Klein argues that a belief is justified only if it is supported by an infinite and non-repeating series of reasons subjectively available to the subject in a form of dispositional beliefs. Klein offers about three standard conditions of subjective availability of dispositional beliefs. I submit that the first condition confuses the disposition to believe with dispositional beliefs and the other two yield unpalatable consequences for Klein's theory of epistemic infinitism. Although this problem is not insurmountable, I argue that it poses a serious challenge to Klein's theory of infinitism and the only safe way out is a serious modification to his version of infinitism.

Prepublished online: December 6, 2014; Published: June 1, 2014  Show citation

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Inusah, H. (2014). Infinitism and Dispositional Beliefs. E-LOGOS, 21(1), 1-11. doi: 10.18267/j.e-logos.366
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