E-LOGOS 2020, 27(1):30-37 | DOI: 10.18267/j.e-logos.469

Karl Popper and the Method of Causal Explanation in Historical Sciences

Jiří Stránský
Západočeská univerzita v Plzni, Plzeň, Czech Republic

The aim of this paper is to describe the method of causal explanation (or so-called “Covering Law Model”) as it was developed by Karl Popper with special regard to its application in historical sciences. For this reason, the subsequent exposition takes into account also the views of Carl Gustav Hempel who was the first one to transfer this method to the field of historical sciences. It is argued that this transfer is a particular demonstration of (predominantly a Neo-positivistic) tendency to formulate a general scientific method and, therefore, an attempt to put historiography into the same category as other sciences. It is also claimed that despite this general tendency, authors like Popper or Hempel probably realize, but do not stress explicitly, that the laws that are used in historical explanations are not of the same kind and do not have the same scientific quality as laws used so-called “hard” sciences like physics for example. The paper is concluded by a brief examination of Popper’s own application of this method in his historical research.

Keywords: Popper, Hempel, causal explanation, historical sciences, covering law model.

Received: December 31, 2019; Revised: December 31, 2019; Accepted: April 19, 2020; Prepublished online: November 1, 2020; Published: September 1, 2020  Show citation

ACS AIP APA ASA Harvard Chicago Chicago Notes IEEE ISO690 MLA NLM Turabian Vancouver
Stránský, J. (2020). Karl Popper and the Method of Causal Explanation in Historical Sciences. E-LOGOS27(1), 30-37. doi: 10.18267/j.e-logos.469
Download citation

References

  1. Donagan, A., Historical Explanation: The Popper-Hempel Theory Reconsidered, In History and Theory, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1964, pp. 3-26. Go to original source...
  2. Dray, W.H., Explanatory Narrative in History, In The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 14, 1954, pp. 15-27. Go to original source...
  3. Hempel, C.G., The Function of General Laws in History, In The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 39, No. 2, 1942, pp. 35-48. Go to original source...
  4. Jefferson, J., Toward Laws in History: Carl G. Hempel and the Evidence Dilemma, In Nebula, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2004, pp. 40-58.
  5. Mandelbaum, M., Historical Explanation: The Problem of 'Covering Laws', In History and Theory, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1961, pp. 229-242. Go to original source...
  6. Paitlová, J., Problém statusu přírodních zákonů v Popperově rané teorii poznání, In Pro-Fil, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2016, pp. 2-14. Go to original source...
  7. Popper, K.R.P., The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London and New York: Routledge, 2002.
  8. Popper, K.R.P., The Open Society and Its Enemies I. The Spell of Plato. London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1945.
  9. Popper, K.R.P., The Open Society and Its Enemies II. The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath. London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1945.
  10. Popper, K.R.P., The Poverty of Historicism. New York and Evanston: Harper & Row Publishers, 1964.
  11. Popper, K.R.P., The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge. London and New York: Routledge, 2009.
  12. Zeleňák, E., Filozofia histórie medzi predpisovaním a opisovaním, In Filozofia, Vol. 73, No. 5, 2018, pp. 356-365.

This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0), which permits non-comercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original publication is properly cited. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.