E-LOGOS 2020, 27(2):57-70 | DOI: 10.18267/j.e-logos.479
In Defense of Semantic Externalism
- Tampere University, Finland
The most popular and influential strategies used against semantic externalism and the causal theory of reference are critically examined. It is argued that upon closer scrutiny, none of them emerges as truly convincing.
Keywords: externalism, meaning, reference, natural kinds.
Received: July 27, 2020; Revised: July 27, 2020; Accepted: December 11, 2020; Prepublished online: December 30, 2020; Published: December 31, 2020 Show citation
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