E-LOGOS, 2026 (vol. 33), issue 1
On the Significance of Critical-Intellectual Opinion (Or On the Deceptive Character of the World)
Štefan Jusko
E-LOGOS 2026, 33(1):4-14 | DOI: 10.18267/j.e-logos.516 
I begin the essay by distinguishing sensory opinion, intellectual opinion, and critical-intellectual opinion as its basic framework, first examining the expressions of the image of the world as a whole (or the world as a whole) – expressions that do not properly belong to philosophy. What they stand for, however – namely the world of representations and the world of concepts – is essentially connected with philosophy. We cannot think the world as a whole as such, yet Nietzsche, through his critical philosophy, shows that the expression the world as a whole can be articulated by philosophical thought. He identified...
History of Philosophy
The Dilemma of Agape in Augustine: An Ethic of Political Passivity or The Foundation of Solidarity?
Alkan Arslan
E-LOGOS 2026, 33(1):15-32 | DOI: 10.18267/j.e-logos.519 
In the history of philosophy, Augustine is a foundational figure marking the transition from the rational-cosmological paradigm of Antiquity to the faith-based interiority of Christianity. This epistemological rupture situates cognition within belief (credo ut intelligam), re-grounding philosophical disciplines around the love of God. In Augustine′s thought, love is not merely a virtue but a central principle synonymous with the will, directing the individual toward liberation from earthly constraints. Augustine′s approach radically diverges from philia or utility-oriented eros, prioritizing the unconditional nature of agape....
Philosophy of Language
On the Semantics and Metaphysics of “Expected”
Lajos Brons
E-LOGOS 2026, 33(1):33-40 | DOI: 10.18267/j.e-logos.520 
The expression ⌜expected x⌝ and other phrases in which “expected” appears to function like an adjective are potentially misleading. Except if x is real and in the past, “expected” is not a predicate, but an operator similar to the doxastic belief operator and an expected x is not an x. Instead, a phrase involving some ⌜expected x⌝ (typically) specifies an expectation about x, and expectations imply agents having those expectations. This analysis matters for moral philosophy, in which expected consequences — which, by implication, are not (a kind of) consequences — play an important role.
Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy
Disinformation and epistemic crises
Filip Tvrdý
E-LOGOS 2026, 33(1):41-56 | DOI: 10.18267/j.e-logos.518 
Contemporary society is experiencing an epistemic crisis, most notably evidenced by the pervasive presence of disinformation in the public sphere. To address this issue effectively, it is crucial to distinguish disinformation from other forms of false or unsubstantiated claims. Only after achieving this clarity can we begin to consider strategies for prevention and mitigation. Simplistic or ideologically driven definitions of disinformation fail to capture its true dangers, thereby hindering efforts to combat its spread. This article has three primary objectives: (1) to expose the shortcomings of the traditional definition of disinformation, (2) to...
The Structure of the State of Exception: From Schmitt to Agamben
Lingxi Chen
E-LOGOS 2026, 33(1):57-67 | DOI: 10.18267/j.e-logos.521 
This article examines the concept of the state of exception in the works of Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben, with particular attention to its role in understanding the relation between law and life. Drawing on Michel Foucault’s analysis of biopolitics, it addresses the problem of how different modalities of power intersect in modern political theory.\r\nWhile Schmitt defines sovereignty through the decision on the exception, thereby grounding the legal order in a moment of political decision, Agamben reinterprets the exception as a structural relation in which law and its suspension coexist. The article argues that Agamben radicalizes Schmitt’s...
