E-LOGOS - Forthcoming articles

On the Significance of Critical-Intellectual Opinion (Or On the Deceptive Character of the World)

Štefan Jusko

E-LOGOS X:X  

I begin the essay by distinguishing sensory opinion, intellectual opinion, and critical-intellectual opinion as its basic framework, first examining the expressions of the image of the world as a whole (or the world as a whole) – expressions that do not properly belong to philosophy. What they stand for, however – namely the world of representations and the world of concepts – is essentially connected with philosophy. We cannot think the world as a whole as such, yet Nietzsche, through his critical philosophy, shows that the expression the world as a whole can be articulated by philosophical thought. He identified...

The Dilemma of Agape in Augustine: An Ethic of Political Passivity or The Foundation of Solidarity?

Alkan Arslan

E-LOGOS X:X  

In the history of philosophy, Augustine is a foundational figure marking the transition from the rational-cosmological paradigm of Antiquity to the faith-based interiority of Christianity. This epistemological rupture situates cognition within belief (credo ut intelligam), re-grounding philosophical disciplines around the love of God. In Augustine′s thought, love is not merely a virtue but a central principle synonymous with the will, directing the individual toward liberation from earthly constraints. Augustine′s approach radically diverges from philia or utility-oriented eros, prioritizing the unconditional nature of agape....

On the Semantics and Metaphysics of “Expected”

Lajos Brons

E-LOGOS X:X  

The expression ⌜expected x⌝ and other phrases in which “expected” appears to function like an adjective are potentially misleading. Except if x is real and in the past, “expected” is not a predicate, but an operator similar to the doxastic belief operator and an expected x is not an x. Instead, a phrase involving some ⌜expected x⌝ (typically) specifies an expectation about x, and expectations imply agents having those expectations. This analysis matters for moral philosophy, in which expected consequences — which, by implication, are not (a kind of) consequences — play an important role.